RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: CONSOLIDATION OF
NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS INAPPROPRIATE WHERE LEAD
COUNSEL ORDER AGGRAVATES CONFLICT OF INTEREST
BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS
IN Dupont v. Southern Pac. Co.' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consolidate suits initiated by the survivors of the passengers and the driver,
especially when the appointment of a lead counsel was also required.
Following a railroad crossing collision involving an automobile and
one of defendant's trains, separate suits were brought against the
railroad by the survivors of the .driver and by the survivors of the
three other occupants of the car. The trial judge, utilizing his
discretionary power under rule 42 (a),2 consolidated the cases and
further required the designation of a lead counsel. Counsel for the
passengers objected to consolidation, asserting that the additional
issue of contributory negligence *in the driver's suit would confuse
and prejudice the jury and that, because the passengers intended to
prove concurrent negligence, a conflict of interests between the
passengers and driver would result. The objection was overruled,
.although the lead counsel order was modified to provide that at the
trial each party might have an *opportunity to examine all witnesses.
The jury retfirned four general. verdicts in favor of the defendant;
thereupon plaintiffs appealed, contending that the order of consolidation was prejudicial and thus an abuse of the trial judge's discretion.
Federal Rule 42 (a)3 provides as follows:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of
any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the
actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 1027 (1967).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (a).
8See generally 2B BARRON & HOLTOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 941-42
(Wright ed. 1961); 5 MooPa, FEDERAL PRACTICE 42.02 (2d ed. 1964).
1 366
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The trial judge is thus given broad authority to consolidate cases, for
the only specified requirement is that the suits contain a single
common question of law or fact; and, in accordance with the stated
purpose of the Federal Rules "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," 4 the judge is encouraged to
make use of this consolidation power wherever possible and fair.5
Courts have consolidated actions by different plaintiffs arising out of
the same tort,6 suits involving the naturalization of several aliens,"
actions challenging the validity of a patent," and numerous claims involving a bankrupt's estate.9 Since the original consolidation statute
of 1813,10 which provided that courts could consolidate cases where
reasonable to avoid unnecessary costs or delay in the administration
of justice, the chief purposes in allowing such consolidation have
been convenience, justice, and judicial economy." Separate trials
are eliminated, time and cost of reduplication of evidence is saved, a
more thorough trial is made possible by having all the parties and
evidence presented at one time, and inconsistent results from identi12
cal or similar evidence are avoided.
Concomitant with these advantages of judicial economy and
justice are certain limitations on the power to consolidate. As one
commentator has observed, courts, in keeping with the policy of
judicial economy, postulate that the actions be capable of reasonably
parallel determination, 1 although under the rule suits need contain
only a single common question of law or fact to be consolidated.
aFRD. R. Civ. P. 1. See also Blume, Required Joinder of Claims, 45 MicH. L. REv.
797, 803 (1947).
5See Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, 204 F. Supp. 426, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 376
U.S. 612 (1964); Weitort v. A. H. Bull & Co., 192 F. Supp. 165, 166 (E.D. Pa. 1961). See
generally CARre, CoDE PLEADING § 76 (2d ed. 1947).
0 E.g., Schreiber Trucking Co. v. Rail Trailer Co., 194 F. Supp. 164 (ED. Pa. 1961);
Rando v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 155 F. Supp. 220 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
7 E.g., United States v. Knauer, 149 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 654
(1946).
8 E.g., Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Dulberg, 194 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d
821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 882 (1961).
' E.g., Martin v. Campanaro, 156 F.2d 127 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 759
(1946).
0
2 Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, § 3, 3 Stat. 21.
Il See MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958); Polak v. Koninklijke
Luchtvaart Maatschappij N. V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland, 19 F.R.D. 87, 88
(S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also Note, 38 IND. L.J. 86 (1962).
12 See Getz v. Robinson, 232 F. Supp. 763, 765 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Moss v. Assodated
Transp., Inc., 33 F.R.D. 335, 337 (ED. Tenn. 1963), aff'd, 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965).
130 U. CHi. L. R.y. 373, 375 (1963).
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Thus, while all of the issues need not be identical, a substantial
community of common questions of law or fact is generally required. 14 Even where this test is met, considerations of justice may
still forbid consolidation where it would be prejudical to one or more
of the parties. 5 As it is conceivable that confusion and prejudice
may result almost any time a case involving another party and
possibly different issues is added, a literal application of this limitation would, in effect, abrogate the consolidation rule. Therefore,
trial courts must balance the likelihood of prejudice and the extent
of consequent harm against the benefits of convenience and judicial
economy.' 6 Only where it is possible that the prejudice created can
significantly affect the outcome of the case is consolidation denied.1"
Before arriving at such a conclusion, however, judges often consider
the means available to mitigate the prejudice.' 8 For instance, in
Gaines v. Racenet 9 the judge suggested that confusion could be
eliminated and a just verdict returned where the court carefully instructed the jury as to the law. Similarly, special verdicts 20 or a general verdict with interrogatories 2l are frequently used to insure that
the jury has not become confused. 22 Generally, then, consolidation
is disallowed only where prejudice is inherent and cannot be eliminated, such as instances in 'which a conflict of interests exists
between the parties23 or where factors in one suit, such as a gruesome
injury to a party, would likely affect the result in another suit. 24
In reversing the jury verdicts for the defendants and remanding
the case, the Fifth Circuit in Dupont seems to have imposed a somei, Compare International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 33 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), with
Schreiber Trucking Co. v. Rail Trailer Co., 194 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
" See Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 15 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Baker
v. Waterman, 11 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); 2B BARRON & HoLrzoFF, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 941, at 177.
26 See Poulson v.-Louisiana, A. & T. Transp. Co., 7 F.R.D. 484 (W.D. La. 1947).
1 See Atkinson v. Roth, 297 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1961); Rankin v. Shayne Bros., 234
F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Miller v. Sammarco, 9 F.R.D. 215 (N.D. Ohio 1949). Compare
Baker v. Waterman, 11 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), with Walker v. Biggs, 7 F.R.D. 78
(ED. Tenn. 1946).
18 Cf. Capstraw v. New York Cent. R.R., 15 F.R.D. 267 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
1
F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
30 See, e.g., Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1965); Getz v. Robinson, 232 F.
Supp. 763 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
21 See, e.g., Plough v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 172 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1949).
"2 See Holtzoff, Entry of Additional Parties in a Civil Action, 31 F.R.D. 101, 111
(1963).
"8See Atkinson v. Roth, 297 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1961); Capstraw v. New York Cent.
R.R., 15 F.R.D. 267 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
"See Baker v. Waterman, 11 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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what stricter standard by requiring only an initial showing that some
prejudice might result in order to disallow consolidation. The court
held that the direct conflict of interest between the passengers and
driver created by the passengers' contention of concurrent negligence
and the confusion caused by the additional issue of contributory
negligence in the driver's suit produced such prejudice in the instant
case. The court further held that the requirement of a lead counsel
prevented either set of plaintiffs from receiving the representation
to which each was entitled, since counsel was required to contest
contributory negligence on the part of the driver and at the same
time to advise the jury that the passengers could recover despite a
finding of contributory negligence. Further, the use of general
verdicts was viewed as prejudicial because they provide no indication
as to the basis for the jury's decision. The dissenting opinion conteided that to reverse there must not only be prejudice but also a
showing that the substantial rights of the parties were adversely
affected. 25 Pursuing this theory the judge concluded that since only
the passengers' rights could be infringed by the confusion and probable resultant imputation of contributory negligence to the passengers, the verdict in the driver's suit should be affirmed and only
the decision in the passengers' actions reversed.
Considering the trial orders, the type of verdict, and the possible
confusion brought about by consolidating suits containing different
issues, there probably was sufficient prejudice to require reversing the
verdicts. That there was sufficient prejudice, though, was not due to
the mere act of consolidation but to the failure of the trial court to
compensate for its possible existence. Accordingly, upon retrial
separate trials do not seem necessary if such prejudice can be mitigated, although the court's language would suggest that separate
trials were required in any event. 28 As stated in Schreiber Trucking
Co. v. Rail Trailer Co.,27 "that there are other questions which are
not common to all the actions does not remove the right to consolidate." Where no suit or charge of negligence is brought against the
driver by a passenger, courts almost always consolidate tle actions
by the driver and the passenger with no apparent adverse effects. 28
25 366 F.2d at 198 (dissenting opinion).
25 See id. at 196-97, 198.
27 194 F. Supp. 164, 165 (F.D. Pa. 1961).
28 See, e.g., Getz v. Robinson, 232 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Gaines v. Racenet, 11
F.R.D. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Miller v. Sammarco, 9 F.R.D. 215 (N.D. Ohio 1949). Contra,
Clark v. Elgin, 25 F.R.D. 248 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
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Where, however, an action is brought by a passenger against his
driver as well as against the other driver, the suits are usually not
consolidated.- In that instance there is a direct conflict of interest
between the passenger and driver. The Dupont case falls somewhere
between these two situations, as here the passengers alleged that the
driver was negligent but asserted no claim.30 A mere allegation,
however, should not be sufficient to prevent consolidation, since as a
practical matter the conflict created is still minimal. The passengers,
not having sued the driver, cannot recover from him even if he were
negligent, and both passengers and driver must prove the train engineer negligent in order for either to recover. Thus, their interests
in this respect are identical. 31 The real danger, as in similar consolidated actions, is the imputation of the driver's possible contributory negligence to the passengers, but such danger should not prohibit consolidation if not accentuated by requirement of a lead
counsel and use of general verdicts. The appellate court, adopting
the procedure generally followed by trial courts, should not require
separate retrials without first considering what different or additional
steps might be taken at the trial level to alleviate prejudice and
allow consolidation. In this case, if the role of the lead counsel were
82
limited to supervising and coordinating the conduct of the cases,
each party would receive more adequate representation, thus reducing the possibility of the jury imputing the driver's contributory
negligence to the passengers. Likewise, the use of a special verdict
would help insure that, the jury had not become confused. Further
steps are also available to limit the prejudice which consolidation
might create. Efficient use of discovery procedures may narrow the
scope of the issues, pre-trial conferences can be used to establish an
organized and economical trial plan, and a careful charge by the
judge can provide an essential guide for the jury's deliberations.8 3
The benefits from consolidation in convenience and judicial economy are so great that only where the outcome probably would be
adversely affected even after employing these methods should consolidation be forbidden.
29See Atkinson v. Roth, 297 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1961).
3 366 F.2d at 194.
81-See Dupont v. Southern Pac. Co., 231 F. Supp. 601, 604 (W.D. La. 1964) (opinion
on plaintiffs' application for permission to prosecute their appeals in forma pauperis).
32 Cf. MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958).
38O
S U. Cm. L. Rnv. 373, 379 (1963).

